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Abstract: 
Using administrative data for the period 2005-2010, we investigate duration and recurrence in 
unemployment benefits in Spain. The results suggest the existence of (at least) three groups of 
individuals, each one with different combinations of covered unemployment duration and 
recurrence. We also find that the impact of the economic crisis has been to increase the duration 
and the recurrence in unemployment benefits. Our findings support the hypothesis that not only 
the heterogeneity but also the previous experience of unemployment benefit increase the 
expected duration in subsequent benefit periods. 
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1. Introduction 
The unemployment rate in Spain has rocketed from 8% in 2007 to 25% in 2012, 
so the number of unemployed individuals increased from about 1.8 million to nearly 6 
million according to the Labour Force Survey (LFS). On the other hand, information 
coming from the registers of the Public Employment Service (PES) shows that the 
number of registered unemployed increased from about 2 million in 2007 to nearly 5 
million at the end of 2012; not all of them were entitled to receive unemployment 
benefits, the number of these ranging from less than 1.5 million in a given month of 
2007 to about 3 million in a given month of 2012. These figures are a serious problem 
not only for the economy but also for the public finance in general and the sustainability 
of the expenditure on the unemployment compensation system (UCS) in particular. 
They call for a profound analysis of entries into and exits from unemployment benefit 
and how they have evolved over time. 
In examining individual joblessness, most studies have focused solely on 
unemployment duration. However, the duration of a spell of unemployment might be 
considered a poor indicator of the joblessness experience in a period of time. This 
implies that recurrence (the re-incidence of individuals into unemployment over time) 
should be considered as well, since it is possible that a non-negligible portion of 
unemployment is accounted for by a relatively numerous group of workers with several 
spells in a given time interval (Clark and Summers, 1979; Winter-Ebmer and 
Zweimüller, 1992). 
Understanding whether the costs of unemployment, particularly repeated 
unemployment, are persistent and what circumstances may influence that persistence is 
an important step toward developing policies to fight joblessness. If labour market 
turnover is high and mean duration of employment spells is reduced, active labour 
market programmes may be inefficient because they may move the unemployed into 
work in the short-term but those workers may also return quickly to joblessness. In 
other words, for such policy to be efficient it requires the unemployed who find a job to 
remain in employment longer. 
Some studies have focused attention on the analysis of the determinants of 
duration of covered unemployment using information on only one individual spell in 
Spain (for instance, Alba-Ramirez, 1999, and Bover et al., 2002, with the LFS; Jenkins 
and García-Serrano, 2004, Arranz and Muro, 2004a with administrative data from the 
PES). However, very few have examined the phenomenon of the existence of multiple 
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spells of unemployment benefit receipt. Cebrián et al. (1995), with data for the period 
1984-1991, found the existence of a high level of recurrent unemployment: about 30 per 
cent of recipients re-appeared again in the UCS within two years and more than 50 per 
cent within four years. Arranz and Muro (2004b), focusing on individuals aged less than 
35, showed that the proportion of recurrence in unemployment benefits (two years) was 
nearly 33% in 1987 and 1995 with a peak of 38.5% in 1991. 
High worker turnover (based on the wide use of temporary contracts after the 
1984 labour market reform and the possibility of linking short-term employment 
contracts with subsequent spells of unemployment benefit) was probably one of the 
potential reasons for the financial strains of the UCS, which led the government to pass 
a reform in 1992 (see Arranz et al., 2009). Under the then new regulation, eligibility to 
UI was tightened and UA widened. In particular, it increased the minimum contribution 
period required to gain access to UI (from 6 to 12 months), reduced the entitlement 
obtained with a given contribution period and cut the UI replacement rates –from 80% 
of the base wage to 70% during the first six months of entitlement and from 70% to 
60% from the seventh month onwards. At the same time, although the extension of the 
minimum contribution period potentially made that more people entered the UA system, 
the criteria was tightened1. Something similar has occurred under the ongoing recession, 
when expenditure on unemployment compensation rocketed in 2009-2010 and 
maintained in high levels in 2011-2012, and a new regulation has been passed which 
includes a reduction of the UI replacement rates (from 60% to 50% from the seventh 
month onwards) and more tighten means-tested criteria to access to UA. Again, one of 
the objectives of the reform is to contribute to reduce the expenditure in the UCS. 
It is in this context in which our work should be understood. The aims of the 
paper are to examine whether it is true that unemployment may be characterised by the 
existence of a large group of workers with long durations in the receipt of benefits and 
other, less numerous group incurring in more recurrence in compensated unemployment 
and shorter durations, and to investigate the factors associated with the duration and 
recurrence in the receipt of unemployment benefits in Spain.  
To reach this objective, we use an administrative database: the “Continuous 
Sample of Working Life” (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL hereinafter). 
                                                          
1
 Arranz et al. (2009) show that these legislative changes had a positive though modest effect on the 
transition rates from unemployment. 
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In order to carry out this analysis, we define an observation window of equal length for 
two periods: one of expansion years (2005-2007) and other of recession years (2008-
2010). In particular, we select the individuals who start the receipt of an unemployment 
benefit anytime during the first quarter of 2005 and 2008, respectively, and followed 
them up until the end of the observation window 31st December 2007 and 2010, 
respectively. 
A duration model is estimated for three groups of recipients who exit to a (long-
term) job without coming back again to the UCS, to a (short-term) job returning again 
to the UCS (individuals with multiple incidences) or to uncovered unemployment after 
exhausting unemployment benefits. We also estimate a duration model for recipients 
with multiple unemployment benefit spells. Multiple occurrences may occur because 
there are multiple observations of the same kind. In these cases is reasonable assume 
that the hazard is the same for all spells for the same individual.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the theoretical 
arguments set forth to explain repeated joblessness. Section 3 gives a description of the 
dataset and undertakes a detailed descriptive analysis in order to find out the 
characterization of unemployment benefit according to recurrence and duration. Section 
4 presents the duration model, while section 5 offers the empirical results. Finally, we 
summarize our findings in section 6.   
 
2. Theoretical explanations 
Duration and repeated unemployment can be approached theoretically from 
different perspectives. In the first place, the job search theory (Mortensen, 1977) 
provides a framework for the discussion of the factors that affect the probability of 
receiving job offers and the probability of accepting it. An important prediction of this 
theory is that, for a given wage offer distribution, since the reservation wage rises with 
the level of unemployment benefit, increases in unemployment compensation lead to a 
reduced probability of making the transition from unemployment to employment. 
However, this conclusion has to be qualified if we take account of the fact that benefit 
entitlement is limited (so the reservation wage of a UI recipient falls with the length of 
the unemployment spell until maximum entitlement is reached) and that eligibility 
depends on past insured employment (so return to employment means that the 
individual re-qualifies for benefit). The latter feature means that UI makes the transition 
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to employment more attractive, so UI may have positive as well as negative effects on 
the transition from unemployment to employment (Atkinson and Mickelwright, 1991). 
In sum, job search theory looks at workers’ mobility and at any intervening spell 
of unemployment as a productivity activity (Jovanovic, 1979; Mortensen, 1988) and can 
explain part of the "frictional" unemployment as a productive time spent on searching 
for an optimal job offer but are less successful in explaining the incidence of multiple 
spells of unemployment (Pissarides,1985).   
Segmentation or dual labour market theory describe two segments with different 
employment and wage conditions, with competition being possible within but not 
between segments (Piore, 1971). External mobility from primary labour market will 
therefore be infrequent and voluntary; moves should really pay and give access to even 
better job ladders. On the contrary, workers in the secondary labour market move across 
jobs that do not define ascending chains; job interruptions are likely to be involuntary 
and associated with spells of unemployment so that no improvement in wages is 
expected from them. In that context, the instability of jobs in the secondary labour 
market (in particular, among young and less-skilled workers) in connection with 
seasonal factors and disincentive effects are some reasons for potential recurrence in the 
receipt of unemployment benefits (Steiner, 1988). 
Other perspectives focus on the issue of state dependence2. Past unemployment 
experiences may determine future unemployment prospects (Heckman and Borjas, 
1980)3. Two types of explanations have been offered to interpret the correlation 
between past and current unemployment periods: the spurious and the true state 
dependence4. The first explanation is based on the fact that individuals differ in certain 
unobserved characteristics that influence their probability to experience unemployment 
in the future, which in turn is not influenced by their past unemployment experience. 
                                                          
2
 Despite the different picture of unemployment when recurrent spells are taken into account, most studies 
have focused attention on the effect of past unemployment (scarring effects) on unemployment. For 
instance, Heckman and Borjas (1980), Lynch (1989) and Omori (1997) with US data; Trivedi and 
Alexander (1989) with Australian data; Roed et al. (1999) using Norwegian data; Arulampalam et al. 
(2000) and Gregg (2001) with British data; Mühleisen and Zimmerman (1994) and Flaig et al. (1993) 
with German data;, Steiner (1989) and Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller(1992) with Austrian data; and 
Arranz and Muro (2004b) with Spanish data.  
3
 The hypothesis that the unemployment process depends on its past history is referred to as "hysteresis" 
in the macroeconomic literature (see Blanchard and Summers, 1986). 
4
 Heckman and Borjas (1980) were the first to distinguish state dependence in three forms: dependence in 
the current duration (duration dependence), dependence in the occurrence (occurrence dependence) and 
dependence on the duration of the past labour market experiences (lagged duration dependence). These 
types of state dependence are named in the literature as true state dependence, where most subsequent 
works (Omori, 1997; Arulampalam et al., 2000, etc.) have focused on the lagged duration dependence. 
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The true state dependence explanation indicates that past unemployment experience has 
a genuine behavioural effect in the sense that an otherwise identical individual who did 
not experience unemployment would behave differently in the future than an individual 
who had experienced unemployment. Then, workers with higher mobility and multiple 
unemployment incidences may be offered less secure jobs because they lose valuable 
work experience while unemployed (Phelps, 1972) or because employers use 
unemployment experience as a signal of low productivity (Lockwood, 1991; Pissarides, 
1992) reducing their future probability of getting a job5.  
 
3. Data and descriptive analysis 
 
3.1. The dataset 
 
 The MCVL provides information every year since 2004 based on the records of 
the Spanish Social Security, combined with personal data from the Continuous 
Municipal Register and, in some versions, tax data from the National Revenue Agency. 
The population of reference in the MCVL includes both employed workers who are 
registered with the Social Security and recipients of contributory and non-contributory 
pensions and unemployment benefits6. 4 percent of this population are selected by 
means of a simple random sampling system7. The resulting database thus provides 
annual information on more than one million people who have had any kind of 
relationship with the Social Security in a given year.  
 This dataset includes information on individual characteristics, firms and job 
attributes. It also provides information on the unemployment benefits received by each 
worker in the event they were separated from their jobs and eligible for them: whether 
each individual was receiving unemployment benefits when out of work, the type of 
benefits received (UI or UA) and the number of days of benefit receipt. 
                                                          
5
 Some authors point out that this apparent negative relationship between unemployment duration and 
employment prospects can have a reverse causation: rather than having poor job prospects because 
individuals become long-term unemployed, individuals are long-term unemployed because they have 
poor job prospects (Roed et al., 2009). 
6
 Jobseekers not receiving benefits and inactive population (as distinct from pensioners) are not included. 
The same applies to workers with a social welfare system other than the Social Security (civil servants 
receiving pensions) and those with none (such as those working in the informal or submerged economy or 
some marginal activities). 
7
 Simple random sampling is used to generate the MCVL (without any kind of stratification), selecting 
people from the annual reference population whose personal identification code contains randomly 
selected figures in a determined order. These figures are identical every year. This method guarantees that 
the same people are selected, as long as they continue to be registered with the Social Security system, 
and also ensures that new entrants are representative of the registered population. 
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 Furthermore, this administrative dataset has a longitudinal design. From 2004 
onwards, an individual who is present in an edition of the sample and subsequently 
remains registered with the Social Security stays as a sample member. The sample is 
refreshed with new sample members, remaining representative of the population in each 
edition. Therefore, its longitudinal nature makes it possible to know the labour market 
status of a given individual after a job separation has taken place: recipient of 
unemployment benefits, non-recipient and other situation. Unfortunately, the data base 
does not contain information on the entitlement period (however, it does on previous 
employment duration, a proxy variable for entitlement duration). 
 
3.2. Descriptive analysis: total number of spells of benefits and individuals (recipients) 
Our first step consists of giving information on the number of spells of receipt of 
unemployment benefits that began annually during the period 2004-2010. Table 1 
provides this information by previous labour relation. We have followed the process 
developed by Arranz et al. (2012) through which the original information of the MCVL 
data source can be organized in such a way as to permit the accurate study of work 
histories8. 
[Insert Table 1] 
As can be observed, the number of spells starting each year is enormous: 3.5 
million in 2004, 4.2 million in 2007 and, as a consequence of the recession, 5.7 million 
in 2008 and 9.8 million in 20109. These figures must be put in contrast with other labour 
market variables in order to have a correct idea of its size. Bear in mind, for instance, 
that the workforce was above 20 million in 2004 and over 23 million from 2008 
onwards, and that the stock of recipients of unemployment benefits in a given month 
was less than 1.3 million in 2004-2005 and 3 million in 2010. 
Most of the spells of recipiency (about 80 percent) in a given year of the period 
2004-2008 start after the end of an employment spell, while the rest begin after the 
exhaustion of previous unemployment benefits (either UI or UA). These proportions 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
8
 These authors show the sample loss and bias which occurs when data regarding spells and individuals 
included in the database are not processed correctly. They propose a procedure for processing the sample 
that we follow step by step. 
9
 These data generally coincide with those provided by the Public Employment Office (Annual Report on 
Labour Statistics). Thus, our procedure for processing the MCVL obtains quite accurate information 
regarding the process of registering unemployment benefit recipients. It should be borne in mind that the 
PES does not include the agricultural subsidy in their figures and that it may conduct some additional 
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were altered in 2009 and 2010 due the rising number of spells due to short-time work, 
after the passing by the government of measures increasing the incentives for firms and 
workers to use short-time work instead of layoffs as an alternative to adjusting to 
reduced product and labour demand. 
We now proceed to select a sample of individuals starting their spells of receipt of 
unemployment benefits in a given year (2005 and 2008) and then follow them up 
through time (for about three years, until the end of 2007 and 2010, respectively). This 
will allow us to know how many people exhibit only one incidence of entry into the 
UCS within the window of observation and how many exhibit several incidences, with 
successive spells of employment and benefits (they may be consecutive, for instance, a 
UI benefit which runs out followed by a UA benefit). In addition, in order to make the 
sample homogeneous, we select recipients between 16 and 64 years-old (in the year of 
the first incidence) receiving UI due to the ending of a labour relationship (because of a 
layoff, end of temporary contract, etc.). 
Table 2 provides the mean and the distribution of durations of benefits for spells 
starting in 2005 and 2008. The first and second grand columns refer to equal periods of 
observation characterized by distinct economic conditions: an upswing (2005-2007) and 
a downswing (2008-2010). We distinguish two types of covered unemployment 
duration: one is computed from the information on spells and the other from the 
information on individuals. The information shown in the columns labeled “Spells” 
refers to the duration of the spells of covered unemployment, while that shown in the 
columns labeled “Individuals” refers to the effective duration of covered unemployment 
of persons (corresponding to the first incidence of covered unemployment within the 
year).  
On the one hand, the duration of the spells of unemployment benefits starting each 
year does not distinguish whether they correspond to the same person or not (and, in the 
first case, whether they are consecutive or not). This duration is calculated dividing the 
total duration of the spells of unemployment benefits starting in a given period by the 
total number of spells. On the other hand, the duration of the (aggregate) spells of 
unemployment benefits of the same person will be called “the unemployment benefits 
duration of individuals”. This duration is calculated taking into account that the spells 
                                                                                                                                                                          
processing (for example, processing administrative errors in variables such as gender, cause of 
termination, year of birth, etc.) which is not conducted in our case. 
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pertaining to the same person are aggregated when they are consecutive, i.e. without an 
employment spell in between. 
If a person has a spell of UI starting in 2008 followed by a spell of UA, we 
consider that they make up one incidence in covered unemployment of the same person 
(in this case, with two spells of consecutive covered unemployment, so the duration of 
both are added up). The same procedure is applied when a person links two consecutive 
spells of UA. The effective average duration of covered unemployment of each person 
is computed as the sum of the first incidence (sum of one or more consecutive spells of 
unemployment benefits) divided by the total number of persons having this first 
incidence. 
[Insert Table 2] 
In what follows, we comment both perspectives and the distinction between the 
duration of spells and the duration of episodes of individuals to provide evidence on the 
duration of covered unemployment10. The number of spells starting in any moment of 
2005 (2008) was 3,111,075 (5,087,375), which corresponds to 2,217,075 (3,446,275) 
different persons. When we compare the mean, the median and the distribution of 
durations by type of scenario –spells or individuals-, what emerges is the existence of 
huge differences. Moreover, the change of the economic and labour market context has 
brought about important effects. 
The mean and median durations of the spells of unemployment benefits initiated 
in a given year (first incidence in the UCS) are lower before the crisis than once the 
crisis began: 125 days vs. 141 days (mean) and 87 days vs. 96 days (median). 
Nevertheless, these figures are much lower than the effective duration of covered 
unemployment of individuals: 201 days and 250 days, respectively, on average, and 120 
days and 143 days, respectively, on median. 
These differences are emphasized when we focus on long-term covered 
unemployment. 10% of the individuals starting a benefit in 2005 and followed up until 
the end of 2007 remain in covered unemployment for more than 534 days, while the 
same proportion exhibit a duration of more than 282 days when we consider the 
information of spells. The effect of the economic crisis is clear, since these durations 
                                                          
10
 Arranz and García-Serrano (2012) show that the magnitude of the duration of unemployment benefit 
recipiency vary considerably when we use either spells or individuals data. They demonstrate empirically 
that the exit hazard rates from recipiency using spells’ data are overestimated when compared to using 
individuals’ data. Therefore, the expected duration of recipiency is underestimated. 
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rise: 10% of the individuals (spells) starting a benefit in 2008 and followed up until the 
end of 2010 remain in covered unemployment for more than 716 days (334 days). 
This information reveals that any analysis of the duration of covered 
unemployment focusing strictly on spells (not individuals) underestimates the “true” 
duration. These differences come from the fact that the durations of individuals are 
constructed adding up the information of consecutive spells of unemployment benefits. 
Given the evidence shown so far, in what follows we only use information on 
individuals, which allows us to exploit the longitudinal information of each person and 
compute the number of incidences per person in covered unemployment in a given 
period, the duration of each incidence and the total accumulated duration. 
Now we turn to focus attention on those individuals starting a spell of receipt after 
the end of a labour relationship, which allows us to consider the same initial conditions 
of individuals11. Our aim is to know how many of them leave the UCS and do not come 
back during a long period of time (three years) and how many return.  
In order to carry out this analysis, we define an observation window of equal 
length for two periods (2005-2007 and 2008-2010) and select the spells of benefits 
starting anytime during the first quarter of 2005 and 2008, respectively. In the first 
window, the individuals start a benefit anytime between the 1st of January 2005 and the 
31st of March 2005, while their successive entries into the UCS may occur until the 
31st of December 2007. In the second window, the individuals start a benefit anytime 
between the 1st of January 2008 and the 31st of March 2008, while their successive 
entries into the UCS may occur until the 31st of December 2010. 
Table 3 contains the number of incidences in the UCS of job losers who started an 
unemployment benefit in the first quarter of 2005 and 2008. The recurrence we obtain is 
relatively high: 45% of individuals accessing the UCS from employment in 2005 
entered only once and did not return to the UCS during the rest of the period (three 
years), while 55% re-entered (of these, 24% exhibited two incidences in the UCS, 13% 
three and 6.5% five or more). Recurrence in the receipt of unemployment benefits 
increased in 2008-2010: 36% of individuals entered and did not come back to the UCS 
anymore, while 64% entered again (of these, nearly 24% had two incidences, 15.5% 
three and about 10% five or more). 
                                                          
11
 Thanks to this selection we try to avoid the “initial conditions” (or length selection) bias in order to 
measure the duration of unemployment. 
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Obviously, the duration of covered unemployment periods may vary depending 
on the number of entries of individuals into the UCS. Table 4 contains the distribution 
of the receipt of unemployment benefit by order of incidences. The results confirm the 
expectation that average (and median) duration of covered unemployment diminish with 
the number of incidences, being longer during the downswing. 
[Insert Table 3 and 4] 
As we mentioned above, there are individuals who enter the UCS and do not 
come back anymore in the period of observation while others re-enter, so the duration of 
their covered unemployment periods may be different. This fact may affect the average 
duration of the first incidence, since we include all individuals in its computation. To 
avoid this bias, Table 5 provides the distribution of the effective duration of the first 
incidence of the individuals starting a benefit after the loss of a job in the first quarter of 
2005 and 2008, distinguishing between those who come back and those who do not 
come back to the UCS. 
 
The mean duration of the covered unemployment periods of the individuals who 
do not return to the UCS is longer than those who return: 257 days (8.6 months) vs. 109 
days (3.6 months) in 2005. These durations are longer for the spells starting in 2008: 
349 days (11.6 months) vs. 122 days (4.1 months). The medians are substantially lower 
than the means. Moreover, 10% of the individuals who do not come back to the UCS 
exhibit  durations longer than 669 days (22 months) if they entered in 2005 and longer 
than 918 days (31 months) if they entered in 2008. 
[Insert Table 5] 
These extremely long durations of the group of workers who only appear once in 
the UCS in the window frame stem from the individuals who do not return to 
employment and either their status after the recipiency of benefits is unknown (it can be 
uncovered unemployment or inactivity) or they remain in the UCS at the end of the 
period of observation. Obviously, the durations are much shorter in the case of the 
group of individuals who only appear once and return to employment after receiving 
benefits. This result underlines the existence of a relatively large group of workers with 
long joblessness durations that can hardly be considered unemployed. 
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4. Econometric model 
In order to carry out the empirical analysis in the next section, we specify two 
continuous time duration models. The first one is a frailty duration data model to 
examine the determinants of the first incidence of individuals who exit from 
unemployment benefits to find a job (or not) and do not return to the UCS anymore. The 
second one is a shared frailty duration data model for repeated incidences in 
unemployment benefits of individuals who find a job and come back to the UCS several 
times. Whilst in the former model information about first incidence in unemployment 
benefits is considered; the latter model includes information about all incidences of 
individuals with recurrences in unemployment benefits. The difference between shared 
and unshared frailty is the assumption of how frailty is distributed in the data. A frailty 
model is a heterogeneity model where the frailties are assumed to be individual (or 
spell) specific. A shared frailty model is a random effect where the frailties are shared 
(or common) among groups of individuals (or spells) and are randomly distributed 
across groups (see, Gutierrez, 2002; and Cleves, 2004). We will use the terminology of 
these authors to present both models. 
 
4.1. Unshared frailty model 
The unshared or individual frailty model defines the hazard function at time t to 
for individual j to be (Cleves et al., 2004)12 
)|(),|( jjjjjj xthxth αα =   j=1,…,n.    (1) 
Where t is the current duration of unemployment benefits; X are covariates and αj 
is the unobserved observation-specific effect. This effect, αj, is known as frailty term 
and represent that the individuals are heterogeneous in the population due to factors that 
remain unobserved. The frailty (α) is some random positive quantity not estimated from 
the data but instead assumed to have mean one (for purposes of identifiability) and 
variance θ, that is estimated from the data. Given the relationship between the hazard 
and survivor functions, we can show from equation 1 that the individual survival 
function conditional on the frailty is 
{ } jjjjjj xtSxtS αα )|(),|( = .       (2) 
                                                          
12
 The hazard function normally is represented as a baseline hazard function that is multiplicatively 
affected by the covariates and unobserved heterogeneity. We omit its representation because it’s not 
necessary in the development that we follow. 
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Where S(t) is the survival function from a standard survival model and may 
include ancillary parameters and covariate effects. If αj has probability density function 
g(α),the unconditional survival function is  
{ } jjjjjj dgxtSxtS j αααθ )()|()|(
0

∞
= .     (3) 
Where we use subscript  θ to emphasize the dependence on the frailty variance θ. 
Following Gutierrez (2002), the log-likelihood function is formed as a combination of 
the failures and censored observations as  
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Where the jth observation corresponding to the time span (t0j,tj), with failure 
occurring at time tj (dj=1) or the failure time being right censored at time tj (dj=0). Note 
that in equation 4, fθ() is the probability density function. 
 
4.2. Shared frailty model 
Shared frailty assumes that similar observations share frailty, even though this 
may vary from group to group. For instance, some individuals might be more prone to 
exhibit recurrences in covered unemployment than others due to unobserved reasons13.  
Suppose we have a data consisting of j observations and i groups (incidences in 
covered unemployment). The index i denotes the group (i=1,2..,n) and j is the 
observation within the group (j=1,…,ni). The hazard rate for the jth individual in the ith 
group is 
(t)h)|(th ijiij iαα =         (5) 
Where by hij(t) we mean h(t|xij), which is the individual hazard given covariates 
xij. For any member of the ith group, the standard hazard function is multiplied by the 
shared frailty term αi. 
Considering the trivariate response (t0ij,tij,dij) that indicate the start time, end time, 
and failure/censoring for the jth individual from the ith group, the contribution of the 
likelihood function for the ijth individual is (see Gutierrez, 2002) 
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=
=
in
1j
iji dD  the likelihood function of the ith group is: 
{ }∏
= 






	
=
i
ij
i
i
n
j
d
ijij
ijij
ijijD
iii thtS
tS
L
1 0
)()(
)()(
α
αα
     (7) 
Where we obtain the likelihood of the ith group integrating out αi  
iiiii dgLL ααα )()(
0

∞
=
       (8) 
Finally, given the unconditional likelihood groups, we estimate the regression 
parameters and θ maximizing the overall log-likelihood function 
=
=
in
1j
iLnLLnL  
 
5. Empirical results 
Here we present the estimate results obtained after applying the econometric 
models described in the previous section to our sample. The dependent variable is the 
duration of covered unemployment and as independent variables we use a set of 
personal characteristics (gender, age, citizenship) and job and employer attributes in the 
previous match (job category, types of contract, tenure, labour market experience, 
industry affiliation, firm size). Two forms of state dependence are accounted through 
the definition of a set of explanatory variables. Lagged duration dependence is the 
cumulative duration of all past spells of unemployment benefit and the duration of the 
previous employment spell14. Duration dependence is captured by using a parameter in 
the duration model. For the estimation of the models presented above, we assume a 
gamma distribution for the frailty (shared and unshared) term and a log-logistic 
distribution for the baseline hazard rate. The estimation results show a significant 
likelihood ratio test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity term in the shared 
                                                                                                                                                                          
13
 Sharing frailty generates dependence between the individuals who share it, whereas conditional on the 
frailty these individuals are independent (Gutierrez, 2002). 
14
 In a previous version of this paper, we took account of occurrence dependence by including a variable 
on the type of the immediate preceding spell (employment versus unemployment benefit). We observed 
that past receipt of unemployment benefits induced longer spells of unemployment in the future. 
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frailty model and we see that the frailty variance in insignificant in the unshared frailty 
model15. 
Table 6 provides the results regarding the first incidence on unemployment 
benefits of individuals who find a job (or not) and do not return to the UCS in the period 
of observation, on the one hand; and individuals who find a job and return to the UCS 
(exhibiting, therefore, multiple incidences in unemployment benefits and intermediate 
employment periods), on the other hand. Separate estimations for expansion years 
(2005-2007) and recession years (2008-2010) are provided16. 
Parameters in all types of duration models are presented in terms of the 
“accelerated failure time” (AFT) parameterization. A negative sign on a coefficient 
under this parameterization implies that the duration is “shortened” by some value per 
unit change in the covariate, i.e. the expected time-to-failure is sooner rather than later. 
Consequently, it is important to note that a negative coefficient implies an increase in 
the hazard rate, while a positively signed coefficient implies a decrease in the hazard17. 
Effects related to initial conditions are measured by the cumulative duration of spells of 
previous benefit recipiency. 
[Insert Table 6] 
We first comment on estimate results of individuals who do not return to the UCS 
again within the period of observation. Later, we focus attention on the results of the 
model using information on individuals who return to the UCS and, therefore, exhibit 
multiples incidences in covered unemployment.  
With relation to the effect of lagged benefit duration on the unemployed, there is 
evidence of positive lagged duration dependence in transitions from covered 
unemployment to employment for recipients who do not return to the UCS anymore in 
both periods. We find that the longer the cumulative unemployment benefit duration, 
the longer the current covered unemployment duration (being also longer in the boom 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Nevertheless, since we are interested in reducing the initial conditions problem and the length bias, 
individuals who start a spell of receipt of benefits after losing a job are the only group considered. 
15
 We observe that if we choose a baseline hazard function that is monotone (Weibull) there is existence 
of an unobserved heterogeneity effect; however, if we choose a baseline hazard function non-monotone 
(log-logistic) the frailty term is not significant. In this case, the unobserved heterogeneity is attributed to 
the passage of the time. 
16
 Table A.1 of the Appendix contains the means and the standard deviations for all covariates included in 
the models. 
17
 In AFT models, a one unit increase in X leads to a β increase in the log survival time. An alternative 
interpretation is that actual survival time rises at a rate of β or by 100·β per cent with a unit increase in X. 
One can also look at the percentage change in the survival time associated with a change in the value of 
some covariate, X, by some amount δ as follows: Percentage change=100·(exp(β*δ)-1). 
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than in the recession). An additional month of covered unemployment in the past 
increases the survival times in current covered unemployment duration by 0.3 per cent 
in the expansion years and around 0.8 per cent in the recession years. This result is in 
accord with the scarring theory: employers may use previous covered unemployment 
experience as a signal of workers’ low productivity, which reduces their future 
probability of getting a job (Lockwood, 1991; Pissarides, 1992). 
We have also interacted the regional unemployment rate and the lagged covered 
unemployment duration to investigate whether the unemployed who had covered 
unemployment experiences in regions with high unemployment rates are less 
stigmatised, as suggested by Omori (1997), or exhibit longer subsequent unemployment 
periods, as suggested by Pissarides (1992. Our findings (not shown) suggest that past 
unemployment benefit duration is longer in regions with higher unemployment rates. 
This result was also detected for Spain during the 1990s (see Arranz and Muro, 2004b). 
Attributes of the immediately prior match seem to influence significantly 
unemployment exit rates. Examining the effect of previous job tenure, we find that the 
longer the previous job duration, the longer the expected duration of recipiency. This 
result can be explained because the previous job tenure is a proxy variable for benefit 
entitlement duration. There is substantial empirical evidence showing that job losers 
with longer tenure in their previous firm are more heavily hit by covered unemployment 
through depreciation of specific human capital (Kuhn, 2002) and that those unemployed 
with longer entitlement durations are the ones who exhibit lower hazard rates from 
unemployment in receipt of benefit (see Cebrián et al., 1995; Arranz and Muro, 2004b). 
With regard to the impact of industry affiliation of previous employer, the 
unemployed who worked in agriculture and public administration during the boom 
remained longer in unemployment benefits; however, once the downswing began, 
workers in the construction sector make up the group who remain longer in receipt of 
benefits. This latter result reflects the impact of the recession in Spain, which has 
incorporated an idiosyncratic shock related to the end of a speculative bubble affecting 
the household prices and, therefore, associated with the construction sector. Therefore, 
the groups whose employment is more related to this sector have been the most hardly 
hit in terms of covered unemployment increases. Since employment in the construction 
sector is mainly male and its expansion has been associated with the large inflows of 
immigration starting in the mid-1990s, the result of the collapse of the construction has 
 17
been a sharp and strong worsening of labour market indicators for (young) men, 
foreign-born people and low-skilled workers (see García-Serrano and Malo, 2013). 
The contractual arrangement the individual had in the last job also affects the 
probability of finding a job when unemployed. The potential relationship between 
seasonal/temporary work and outflow form unemployment is captured in our 
regressions through the variable ‘types of contract’. Workers with temporary contracts 
survive shorter in covered unemployment than workers who were holding open-ended 
contracts, either in expansion or in recession. Nevertheless, we should be cautions with 
this result since open-ended contracts are associated to longer entitlement durations and, 
therefore, lower hazard rates from covered unemployment. 
One of the key variables with different effects on the transition from covered 
unemployment to a job is the employer size. While this variable did not affect the 
probability of exiting from covered unemployment to a job during boom years, a clear 
negative relationship between the firm size and the duration of unemployment benefit 
recipiency is observed during the trough: the larger the employer, the sooner the 
individuals leave compensated unemployment. This result may indicate that workers in 
large firms possess certain unobserved characteristics which make them more prone to 
come back to employment quickly. Other possibility is that large employers rest more 
heavily on rehirings, so unemployed workers separated temporarily from these firms 
exhibit greater chances of being recalled when compared with workers from small and 
medium-sized firms (see Alba et al., 2007; Arranz and García-Serrano, 2011), although 
probably this explanation applies more to the group of unemployed with multiple 
incidences than to this one. 
The dataset we use does not include either reliable information of individual’s 
educational attainment or data on occupation. However, it provides a variable on the job 
category, which is related to the required level of qualification for the job, so it may be 
taken as a proxy of qualifications and educational levels. The results point out that 
workers previously employed in white-collar high-skilled (WCHS) jobs exhibit a higher 
probability of finding a job and not coming back to the UCS in both periods. On the 
contrary, blue-collar low-skilled (BCLS) workers have less probability of finding a job. 
In particular, BCLS workers survive about 48 (89) per cent longer in the receipt of 
unemployment benefit in expansion (recession) years when compared with WCHS 
workers (reference category).  
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Finally, personal variables such as gender and age also play a role in shaping the 
transitions from unemployment benefit to a job: men and younger workers survive less 
time in unemployment benefits than women and older workers do in both periods.  
Now we turn our attention to the estimate results concerning the unemployed who 
experience multiple incidences in the receipt of benefits. First, we find (as previously) 
that the lagged cumulative benefit experience increases the current benefit duration. 
Nevertheless, this effect is smaller than in the case of the unemployed who find a job 
and do not come back to the UCS. We have also differentiated between the effect of the 
cumulative lagged benefit duration of previous periods and the lagged duration between 
unemployment benefit periods, in order to distinguish between short-run and long-run 
effects of previous unemployment benefit experience. The results (not shown) suggest 
that the longer the lagged benefit period, the longer the current benefit duration, being 
this effect bigger than with the cumulative lagged duration variable. 
The effects of some variables (job category, firm size, regional conditions and 
age) are rather similar to the ones obtained previously. For instance, in the case of the 
impact of age, we find that younger workers are more likely to exit unemployment 
benefits sooner than older workers. It is a fact that they are more willing to move from 
jobs for improving their job match and eventually settling in a more stable career path. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that temporary employment fall disproportionally on young 
workers, so they are more prone to enter unemployment involuntarily and move 
repeatedly between employment and unemployment. With regards to the impact of the 
regional economic conditions, the probability of finding a job in regions with 
unemployment rates under the average is significantly higher than in regions with 
unemployment rates over the average in all estimations, although this effect is slightly 
smaller during the recession period. 
On the other hand, the impacts of gender, citizenship and industry change 
considerably. While women who find a job and do not return to the UCS remain longer 
in unemployment benefit than their male counterparts, male (and non-Spanish) workers 
are the groups who exhibit less probability of finding a job among the ones who 
experience multiples incidences in unemployment benefits. Moreover, when compared 
with individuals who worked in the construction sector, workers from agriculture, 
public administration and education exhibit are less likely to move to employment. On 
the contrary, workers from the health sector show a higher probability of transitions 
between unemployment benefit and unstable employment: they survive about 87 per 
 19
cent shorter time in unemployment benefit than the ones from the reference group. This 
finding agrees with previous results concerning the extension of rehirings and the 
linking of successive short contracts with periods of unemployment benefit in that 
sector (Arranz and García-Serrano, 2011). 
Finally, Figure 1 captures the estimated current duration dependence 
distinguishing between the individuals who find a job and return to the UCS and the 
ones who find a job and do not return (at first incidence). First, there is positive duration 
dependence up to a maximum between 0 and 3 months and negative duration 
dependence thereafter. The negative duration dependence is especially strong for the 
individuals who do not return to the UCS. The large increase in the intensity during the 
first three months can be explained by the fact that the high-skilled generally find a job 
during the first months of unemployment benefit. The negative duration dependence 
may be due to loss of human capital or stigmatization effects. 
Second, the estimated hazard rates of recipients who find a job and return to the 
UCS are higher than the ones corresponding to the unemployed who find a job and do 
not return to the UCS (in both periods). Third, this latter group remained in 
unemployment benefit shorter during the boom years than during the trough years; 
however, in the case of the former, there are not differences between periods in the 
estimated hazard rate. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
  
 6. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper has been to investigate the duration and recurrence in 
the receipt of unemployment benefits in Spain across the period 2005-2010. We have 
focused attention on examining, on the one hand, whether unemployment benefit may 
be characterised by the existence of a large group of workers with long recipiency 
durations and other, less numerous group incurring in more recurrence in compensated 
unemployment and shorter durations, and, on the other hand, which are factors 
associated with the duration and recurrence in unemployment benefits. In order to carry 
out this analysis, we have made use of administrative data from the MCVL defining an 
observation window of equal length for two periods, one of expansion years (2005-
2007) and other of the recession years (2008-2010), which allows one to analyse the 
impact of changing economic conditions on unemployment benefit duration and 
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recurrence. This is the first paper that addresses the study of recurrence in UCS using 
the referred data and methodology for Spain18. 
Regarding the first issue, our findings suggest the existence of (at least) three 
groups of unemployed: 
 The first one (55% and 64% of the individuals accessing the UCS in 2005 and in 
2008, respectively, after the loss of a job) is comprised of workers who enter 
and exit the UCS with relatively short unemployment benefit durations (their 
durations were 109 days in 2005-2007 and 122 in 2008-2010). 
 The second one (37% in 2005 and 23% in 2008) is made up of individuals who 
exhibit only one but long experience in the UCS, returning to employment in a 
relatively longer period of time (189 days in 2005-2007 and 217 days in 2008-
2010). 
 And the third one (7.8% in 2005 and 12.8% in 2008) consists of workers who 
spend a lot of time out of employment (578 days in 2005-2007 and 590 days in 
2008-2010) and end up either out of the labour force or still receiving benefits 
at the end of a period of three years. 
We find that the recurrence and duration in unemployment benefits are relatively 
high and have increased during the recession period compared to the boom years.  
As for the second question, we find that recurrent and duration in unemployment 
benefits is not only affected by seasonal effects or demand factors but also by personal 
or job characteristics and by the previous unemployment experience in benefits. In 
particular, we find evidence that the previous unemployment benefit increase the current 
unemployment benefit duration, being this effect also longer in the boom than in the 
recession, and higher in the individuals with multiples incidences in UCS than those 
with only one incidence. This result is consistent with the scarring theory (Lockwood, 
1991; Pissarides, 1992), where employers use previous unemployment experience as a 
signal of workers’ low productivity or human capital decay.  
The coefficients obtained by variables related to personal characteristics of 
workers who do not return UCS more indicate that survive more time in unemployment 
benefits women, older people and blue collar low skilled (who are presumably in 
possession of lower specific human capital). Concerning job characteristics, workers 
                                                          
18
 As we mentioned above, there are few studies that analyse recurrence in unemployment benefits: 
Cebrian et al. (1995) for the period 1984-1991 and Arranz and Muro (2004b) for the period 1987-1995. 
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who held an open-ended contract; were employed in a small firm and their job was in 
the construction sector survive more time in unemployment benefits.  
In contrast, for the workers with multiple incidences in unemployment benefits 
whilst some variables as job category, firm size and age are rather similar to the ones 
mentioned for the unemployed with one incidence. Others as the impact of gender, 
citizenship and industry change considerably. Thus, men, non-Spanish and workers 
from the public administration, education and agriculture are the group of unemployed 
who remain longer time in unemployment benefits within the group of unemployed 
with multiples incidences in UCS. On the contrary, workers from the health sector 
exhibit higher probability of exiting from UCS to unstable employment. 
Another important result is that the duration dependence differs in magnitude (not 
much in shape) and over business cycle on the collective of unemployed considered. 
Whist the duration dependence is positive during the first months (up to three months) 
and negative duration dependence thereafter in both groups (especially negative for the 
unemployed with multiple incidences); the estimated hazard rates of the unemployed 
with multiple incidences are higher than those with only one incidence.  There are not 
effects of the business cycle over the estimated hazard rates in the case of the former, 
but for the latter group the estimated hazard rate is higher in the boom years than in the 
recession years. 
In summary, our results should contribute to an understanding of duration and 
recurrent unemployment benefit and help to implement adequate policy measures. Our 
findings indicate that there seems to be a sort of segmentation in the Spanish labour 
market into individuals with longer unemployment benefit duration and longer jobs, on 
the one hand, and individuals with frequently transitions between unemployment 
benefits and unstable employment with multiples incidences in UCS, on the other hand. 
Government could design policy measures (e.g. promoting education or training) that 
help specific collectives (women, older workers, non-manual low skilled) to reduce 
long-term unemployment. A labour market reform on the UCS that include  experience 
rating system is necessary to limit the pervasive use of fixed-term contracts and 
repeated use of the unemployment benefits. We have to avoid that unemployment 
benefits will artificially subsidize the regular use of temporary jobs.  
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Table 1. Number of spells of unemployment benefits starting each year, by origin. 
MCVL, 2004-2010. 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Missing value  
Cases 5,900 4,125 4,250 17,175 15,100 13,825 17,900 
 % 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.4 0.26 0.15 0.18 
Self-
employment 
 
Cases 22,250 22,475 23,175 30,850 38,325 50,725 52,200 
 
% 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.72 0.66 0.54 0.53 
No mention  
Cases 13,350 10,375 9,525 16,125 13,650 15,650 15,625 
 
% 0.38 0.29 0.26 0.38 0.24 0.17 0.16 
Open ended 
contract 
 
Cases 534,375 552,425 578,400 673,375 993,875 1,336,550 1,027,625 
 % 15.11 15.3 15.66 15.82 17.21 14.29 10.45 
Temporary per 
task 
 
Cases 865,650 885,175 928,400 1,084,950 1,593,400 1,647,475 1,641,075 
 
% 24.47 24.51 25.13 25.49 27.59 17.61 16.68 
Casual contract  
Cases 715,500 722,000 747,375 811,125 1,069,650 1,155,575 1,171,750 
 
% 20.23 20 20.23 19.06 18.52 12.35 11.91 
Other fixed- 
term contract 
 
Cases 330,275 322,600 318,150 354,400 438,900 554,375 615,725 
 
% 9.34 8.93 8.61 8.33 7.6 5.93 6.26 
Agricultural 
jobs 
 
Cases 285,325 280,375 281,925 286,475 330,825 403,100 455,375 
 
% 8.07 7.76 7.63 6.73 5.73 4.31 4.63 
Domestic Work  
Cases 600 525 975 3,775 4,175 5,875 6,875 
 
% 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 
UI (Job 
extinción) 
 
Cases 387,100 412,525 428,300 531,600 749,700 1,324,625 1,387,875 
 
% 10.94 11.42 11.59 12.49 12.98 14.16 14.11 
UI (Job 
suspensión) 
 
Cases 41,050 61,725 42,075 94,625 96,200 2,036,750 2,063,200 
 % 1.16 1.71 1.14 2.22 1.67 21.77 20.98 
UA  (+52 years  
or temporary 
per task)  
 
 
 
Cases 32,900 34,000 32,325 35,525 33,850 63,350 85,625 
 
% 0.93 0.94 0.87 0.83 0.59 0.68 0.87 
UA (job 
extinction and 
suspension) 
 
 
 
Cases 303,025 302,475 299,600 316,250 396,700 747,225 1,294,875 
 
% 8.57 8.38 8.11 7.43 6.87 7.99 13.17 
Weighted 
sample 
 
Cases 3,537,300 3,610,800 3,694,475 4,256,250 5,774,350 9,355,100 9,835,725 
 
% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: Own elaboration with the MCVL. “UI” means unemployment insurance and “UA” unemployment 
assistance. 
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Table 2. Mean and distribution of duration of unemployment benefits starting in 2005 
or 2008 (spells and individuals). MCVL, 2005-2010. 
 Starts in 2005 
(2005-2007 period) 
Starts in 2008 
(2008-2010 period) 
 Spells Individuals Spells Individuals 
1st incidence     
Mean duration 125 
 
201 
 
141 
 
250 
 
Percentile (%)     
1 1 4 1 4 
5 4 13 2 14 
10 9 22 7 25 
25 30 52 30 61 
50 87 120 96 143 
75 181 240 183 351 
90 282 534 334 716 
95 394 729 485 816 
99 729 1.096 729 990 
All incidences 
   
 
Average number of spells - 2,6 (2) - 3,4 (3) 
Average number of incidences 
- 2,1 (1) - 
 
2,4 (2) 
Average incidence duration 
- 141 (78) - 
 
163 (85) 
Accumulated average duration 
of incidences - 296 (210) - 
 
392 (335) 
Observations(weighted) 3,111,075 2,217,075 5,087,375 3,446,275 
Note: See Table 1. 
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Table 3. Number of incidences in the UCS of individuals. MCVL, 2005-2010. 
 Years 2005-2007 Years 2008-2010 
Number of 
incidences 
Cases % % 
accumulated 
Cases % % accumulated 
1 9,398 44.9 44,9 10.447 36.2 36.2 
2 5,056 24.1 69,0 6.842 23.7 59.9 
3 2,753 13.1 82,1 4.464 15.5 75.4 
4 1,542 7.4 89,5 2.774 9.6 85.0 
5 828 4.0 93,5 1.521 5.3 90.3 
6 439 2.1 95,5 897 3.1 93.4 
7 246 1.2 96,7 543 1.9 95.3 
8 145 0.7 97,4 333 1.2 96.4 
9 105 0.5 97,9 202 0.7 97.1 
10 69 0.3 98,2 132 0.5 97.6 
+ 10 369 1.8 100 697 2.4 100.0 
Sample 20,950 28,852 
Weighted 523,750 721,300 
Source: See Table 1. 
 
 
Table 4. Unemployment benefits distribution (in days) by order of incidences. MCVL, 
2005-2010. 
 
 Years 2005-2007 Years 2008-2010 
 Incidences Incidences 
Distribution 
1st 
 
2nd  
 
3rd  1st 
 
2nd  
 
3rd  
Percentile (%) 
 
  
 
  
1 2 1 1 3 2 1 
5 9 6 4 10 7 5 
10 16 11 9 18 13 10 
25 40 26 20 42 32 26 
50 103 67 52 110 89 69 
75 192 134 120 239.5 194 158 
90 446.5 240 198 609 394 294 
95 668 342 267 823 581 410 
99 1067 684 498 1045 841 718 
Sample 20,950 11,552 6,496 28,852 18,405 11,563 
Weighted 523,750 288,800 162,400 721,300 460,125 289,075 
Mean 
(S.E) 
176 
(230) 
109 
(148) 
87 
(116) 
204 
(253) 
155 
(186) 
120 
(146) 
Note: See Table 1. 
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Table 5. Unemployment benefits distribution (in days) of first incidence of individuals 
who either return or do not to the UCS. MCVL, 2005-2010. 
 Years 2005-2007 Years 2008-2010 
 
Do not return UCS 
(1st incidence) 
Return 
UCS (+1 
incid.) 
Do not return UCS 
(1st incidence) 
Return 
UCS (+1 
incid.) 
 
All Find a job Do not 
find a job 
All All Find a 
job 
Do not 
find a job 
All 
Mean 
(S.E.) 
257 (296) 189 
(195) 
578 (445) 109 (123) 349 (327) 217 (222) 590 (351) 122 (143) 
Percentile (%)         
1 5 5 6 2 5 5 7 2 
5 16 15 54 7 18 14 90 8 
10 26 24 120 12 35 26 121 14 
25 69 58 184 30 101 67 243 32 
50 141 120 546 72 186 124 653 77 
75 336 242 730 138 599 270 940 149 
90 669 467 1.095 243 918 581 1.031 282 
95 749 644 1.379 364 1.017 729 1.057 427 
99 1,354 769 2,106 638 1,070 939 1,093 724 
Sample 9,398 7,764 1,634 11,552 10,447 6,759 3,688 18,405 
Weighted 234,950 194,100 40,850 288,800 261,175 168,975 92,200 460,125 
Note: See Table 1. 
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Table 6. Estimate results of the duration log-logistic model. Individuals who (1) find a 
job and do not return to the UCS and (2) find a job and have multiples incidences in the 
UCS. MCVL, 2005-2010.  
 Find a job & DO NOT return UCS 
(1 st incidence) 
Find a job & return UCS 
(Multiple incidences) 
 Years 2005-2007 
 
Years 2008-2010 Years 2005-2007 
 
Years 2008-2010 
 Param. S.E. Sig Param S.E. Sig Param. S.E. Sig Param. S.E. Sig 
Gender (males) 
-0.369 0.025 *** -0.256 0.029 *** -0.100 0.021 *** 0.144 0.018 *** 
Nationality 
(Spanish) 0.044 0.044  0.067 0.038 * -0.192 0.042 *** -0.191 0.026 *** 
Age groups             
<26 years old - - - - - -       
35-44 years old 0.264 0.036 *** 0.355 0.041 *** 0.182 0.038 *** 0.096 0.031 *** 
35-45 years old 0.383 0.041 *** 0.551 0.046 *** 0.042 0.041  -0.043 0.033  
+45 years old 0.584 0.046 *** 0.911 0.051 *** 0.041 0.044  0.005 0.035  
Job category             
WCHS - - - - - -       
WCMS 0.192 0.071 *** 0.192 0.077 *** -0.035 0.065  -0.314 0.054 *** 
WCLS 0.135 0.052 *** 0.320 0.058 *** 0.615 0.047 *** 0.337 0.042 *** 
BCHS 0.219 0.056 *** 0.576 0.063 *** 0.433 0.052 *** 0.169 0.044 *** 
BCMS 0.277 0.057 *** 0.597 0.065 *** 0.448 0.052 *** 0.104 0.045 ** 
BCLS 0.398 0.053 *** 0.639 0.060 *** 0.679 0.050 *** 0.302 0.043 *** 
Industry             
Agriculture, fish 0.247 0.089 *** -0.192 0.094 ** 0.511 0.052 *** 0.271 0.039 *** 
Manufact. Energy 0.031 0.044  -0.051 0.053  -0.397 0.036 *** -0.331 0.031 *** 
Construction 
- - - - - - 
     *** 
Trade 0.060 0.046  -0.077 0.052  0.111 0.041 *** 0.190 0.034 *** 
Hotels and 
restaurants 0.067 0.052  -0.152 0.060 *** -0.334 0.042 *** -0.480 0.033 *** 
Transport 
-0.133 0.058 ** -0.147 0.065 ** -0.901 0.046 *** -0.898 0.035 *** 
Business activities, 
financial 
intermediation, real 
state and renting 0.004 0.040  0.044 0.045  -0.337 0.031 *** -0.336 0.024 *** 
Public 
Administration 0.354 0.059 *** -0.063 0.072  0.226 0.044 *** 0.267 0.036 *** 
Education 0.150 0.093  -0.183 0.103 * 0.228 0.078 *** 0.091 0.062  
Health 0.074 0.067  -0.313 0.075 *** -1.128 0.051 *** -1.127 0.042 *** 
Other services, 
personal services 
and housing 0.103 0.063 * -0.203 0.075 *** -0.593 0.052 *** -0.701 0.041 *** 
Firm size            
 
0 
-0.032 0.031  -0.019 0.035  -0.317 0.025 *** -0.422 0.019 *** 
1-9 workers - - - - - -       
10-19 workers 0.047 0.046  -0.070 0.050  -0.112 0.035 *** -0.057 0.026 ** 
20-49 workers 0.016 0.044  -0.111 0.047 ** -0.166 0.034 *** -0.152 0.025 *** 
50-249 workers 
-0.005 0.039  -0.127 0.043 *** -0.374 0.030 *** -0.294 0.023 *** 
250+ workers 
-0.029 0.041  -0.186 0.046 *** -0.378 0.032 *** -0.383 0.024 *** 
Contract in 
previous job 
            
Open-ended - - - - - -       
Temporary per task 
-0.266 0.036 *** -0.044 0.040  -0.058 0.029 ** -0.137 0.024 *** 
Casual 
-0.243 0.034 *** -0.201 0.038 *** -0.042 0.028  -0.076 0.023 *** 
Other fixed-term 
-0.507 0.048 *** -0.427 0.055 *** -0.256 0.037 *** -0.313 0.029 *** 
Regions & 
unemployment 
rate       
      
Over average - - - - - -       
Average 
-0.248 0.033 *** -0.136 0.037 *** -0.197 0.028 *** -0.073 0.023 *** 
Under average 
-0.291 0.025 *** -0.296 0.029 *** -0.245 0.022 *** -0.067 0.018 *** 
Prev. Job Durat 
(Months) 0.004 0.001 *** 0.004 0.001 ***       
Previous occur in 
UB(Yes) -0.148 0.027 *** -0.159 0.031 *** -0.606 0.029 *** -0.538 0.023 *** 
Lagged Accum. UB 
duration (months) 0.003 0.001 *** 0.008 0.001 *** 0.001 0.000 *** 0.003 0.000 *** 
Gamma 0.681 0.006 *** 0.793 0.008 *** 0.763 0.004 *** 0.825 0.003 *** 
Constant 5.489 0.093 *** 5.715 0.097 *** 4.891 0.085 *** 5.102 0.066 *** 
Observs(failure) 19,883(7513) 27,599(6,556) 42,918(31,695) 77,953(60,054) 
Log-likelihood -16,711.378 -18,002.517 -62,958.454 -119,731.42 
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Figure 1. Estimated hazard rates from Table 6. MCVL, 2005-2010.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics (mean) of first incidence on unemployment benefit of individuals who 
either return or do not return to the UCS. MCVL, 2005-2010. 
 
 Years 2005-2007  Years 2008-2010 
 Do not return UCS 
(1st incidence) 
Return 
UCS (+1 
incid.) 
Do not return UCS 
(1st incidence) 
Return 
UCS (+1 
incid.) 
 
Find a 
job 
Do not  
find a job 
Find a 
job 
Do not  
find a job 
Find a 
job 
Vuelven 
al SPD 
Gender       
Males 0.553 0.347 0.520 0.539 0.508 0.578 
Females 0.447 0.653 0.480 0.461 0.492 0.422 
Nationality       
Spanish 0.928 0.918 0.929 0.843 0.814 0.846 
Age groups       
Less than 30 years 0.365 0.182 0.288 0.347 0.206 0.269 
>30 & 45 years 0.475 0.446 0.494 0.485 0.454 0.498 
> 45 years 0.160 0.371 0.219 0.169 0.340 0.233 
Job category       
WCHS 0.069 0.053 0.048 0.072 0.031 0.041 
WCMS  0.045 0.040 0.034 0.055 0.039 0.033 
WCLS 0.277 0.277 0.209 0.281 0.254 0.197 
BCHS 0.204 0.165 0.215 0.205 0.233 0.275 
BCMS 0.157 0.165 0.159 0.140 0.154 0.146 
BCLS 0.248 0.300 0.335 0.246 0.289 0.309 
Industry       
Agriculture and fish 0.017 0.023 0.030 0.024 0.014 0.033 
Manufact. and energy 0.162 0.166 0.151 0.128 0.137 0.113 
Construction  0.127 0.084 0.124 0.111 0.152 0.130 
Trade 0.169 0.207 0.128 0.175 0.183 0.110 
Hotels and restaurants 0.085 0.094 0.094 0.084 0.088 0.089 
Transport 0.065 0.040 0.049 0.067 0.048 0.050 
Business activities, financial 
intermediation, real state 
and renting 0.213 0.186 0.216 0.247 0.253 0.305 
Public Administration 0.054 0.085 0.077 0.048 0.041 0.060 
Education 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.020 0.013 0.017 
Health 0.047 0.043 0.077 0.055 0.032 0.061 
Other services, personal 
services and housing 0.044 0.056 0.037 0.041 0.039 0.031 
Firm size       
0 0.382 0.323 0.340 0.314 0.346 0.330 
1-9 workers 0.185 0.218 0.156 0.207 0.242 0.190 
10-19 workers 0.076 0.089 0.079 0.087 0.084 0.083 
20-49 workers 0.089 0.116 0.106 0.104 0.098 0.102 
50-249 workers 0.136 0.134 0.154 0.143 0.124 0.147 
250+ workers 0.132 0.120 0.166 0.144 0.107 0.149 
Contract in previous job       
Open-ended 0.245 0.384 0.164 0.286 0.347 0.177 
Temporary per task 0.325 0.248 0.369 0.295 0.334 0.409 
Casual 0.317 0.274 0.314 0.308 0.267 0.276 
Other fixed-term 0.113 0.094 0.154 0.111 0.052 0.137 
Previous job duration       
< 6 months 0.478 0.378 0.655 0.490 0.436 0.638 
≥6 months & <1 year 0.194 0.161 0.176 0.178 0.170 0.180 
≥1 year y <3 years 0.242 0.252 0.130 0.234 0.236 0.140 
≥3 years  0.087 0.208 0.039 0.098 0.157 0.042 
Labour experience       
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≤ 2  0.162 0.167 0.122 0.150 0.151 0.103 
>2 & ≤3 years 0.129 0.103 0.114 0.136 0.126 0.112 
>3 & ≤6 years 0.316 0.257 0.326 0.258 0.254 0.255 
>6 & ≤10 years 0.271 0.252 0.268 0.253 0.241 0.291 
>10 & ≤15 years 0.072 0.119 0.089 0.141 0.150 0.153 
>15 & ≤20 years 0.030 0.043 0.037 0.037 0.041 0.043 
>20 years 0.020 0.060 0.044 0.025 0.037 0.043 
Unemployment benefit 
duration (days) 188.2 591.3 108.7 216.9 603.0 121.7 
Accum. unemployment 
benefit        
=0 days 0.361 0.401 0.196 0.391 0.391 0.225 
>0 & 1 year 0.318 0.225 0.343 0.323 0.243 0.337 
> 1 & ≤3 years  0.211 0.241 0.262 0.197 0.214 0.257 
> 3 & ≤ 6 years 0.089 0.103 0.150 0.072 0.113 0.136 
> 6 years 0.022 0.030 0.048 0.017 0.039 0.046 
Sample 7,522 1,288 11,223 6,560 3,157 17,903 
Sample (weighted) 188,050 32,200 280,575 164,000 78,925 447,575 
 
